Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
INTRODUCTION
The world forever changed after 11 September 2001. After the events of 9/11, when terrorists attacked US soil by flying commercial airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there was an outcry by the US public to determine who was responsible for the attack.
This swell of public support demanded the US government punish those who were responsible to ensure US citizens were not attacked again. President George W. Bush answered those demands. In October 2001, US forces began Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Public opinion was overwhelming in support of OEF. According to a Gallup survey in November 2001, 89 percent of those surveyed supported sending forces to Afghanistan while 9 percent did not support the deployment of troops. 1 As of August 2007, the support for OEF had dropped to 70
percent. 2 Even with public opinion declining, the US government continued to prosecute terrorist outside Afghanistan.
In March 2003, forces from the United States and other allied countries invaded Iraq for the purpose of conducting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Again public opinion was very much in support of the operations. According to a Gallup poll, 75 percent of those surveyed supported the operations. 3 Compare that statistic to 23 percent who did not support the operations. 4 Less than three months after OIF had commenced President Bush announced major combat operations have been completed and mission accomplished. Five years after OIF begun, the public support for operations has reversed. A 2008 Gallup poll showed only 36 percent of those surveyed supported OIF. 5 These statistics demonstrate public opinion is critical for long term strategic success in military operations.
In today's global environment, the opinion of the US public and the world public is essential for the United States to accomplish its strategic objectives. The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs (CJCS) has concluded that public opinion is extremely important in joint operations. CJCS concluded IO is so important that guidance for communicating the strategic message has been included in various planning documents. Commanders, at all levels of warfare, need to recognize their actions will have an impact on public opinion. United States Air
Force (USAF) squadron commanders and their Airmen can use various techniques to help communicated that strategic message.
The research methodology for this paper was a review and an analysis of current communication doctrine and practices. The paper will begin by defining various terms according to USAF and Joint Publications (JP). It will then examine how adversaries are currently using various techniques to communicate their message. The paper will then review training for public affairs officers. It will then conclude by providing recommendations for USAF squadron commanders and their Airmen to communicate the US strategic message.
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
There are several crucial concepts to understand with regard to public opinion. The first concept is that of strategic communications. JP 5.0 Joint Operations Planning defines strategic communication as "Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of the US Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs plans, themes, messages and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of power." 6 Basically, strategic communications is the idea or message the US Government is trying to communicate to the US and world public. Others would define strategic communication as both message and action that needs to be integrated into the instruments of National Power. 7 The US officer who has tried to counter the information attacks of insurgents. He claims "the goal is to control the environment by influencing population in order to build popular support in key cities and to erode direct and indirect support of guerillas in Iraq." 21 Emery further claims the United
States must accomplish two effects to succeed in Iraq.
Emery first argues the United States must convince the Iraqi people that the presence in
Iraq is only temporary and the presence will benefit the Iraqi people. This would be an example of using IO to accomplish operational and strategic objectives. His second argument is US forces should persuade Iraqis that assisting insurgents is not in Iraq's best interest. He continues to state that US forces need to also convince Iraq's to deceive the insurgents. 22 This second argument focuses on using IO to accomplish tactical objectives. US forces in Iraq are using IO on insurgents and on the Iraqi population. However, IO must not just focus on the Iraqi population. It must also focus on the US and world population.
Author Phillip Evert claims, "Warfare is not possible, however, when taxpayers are not willing to foot the bill for maintaining armies, and people (men in particular) are not prepared on a large scale to risk their lives as well as to kill unknown other on command." 23 Joint doctrine also states PA operations should assist the media and military. PA operations set the environment and rules for interaction between the media and the military. By accomplishing this, the media is able to gain the access it requires to publish a story. PA operations also need to protect military operations by ensuring appropriate information and operations security (OPSEC). 27 Just as joint doctrine discusses PA operations, Air Force doctrine also addresses PA operations.
AFDD 2-5. One characteristic of effective SAF/PA operations is that it should be timely. In today's environment of globalization, information and ideas can be transmitted across the world in a matter of seconds. PA operations can use this near instantaneous capability to communicate the strategic, operational and tactical messages to audiences all around the world. The technological advances of today allow leaders of all nations to comprehend the unfiltered strategic message and goals of the United States in a relatively short time.
Another characteristic of SAF/PA operations is the element of truthfulness in the information it disseminates. Because some incidents or issues are complicated, it takes a substantial amount of time to undercover the truth behind the incident. In these situations, it is vital for PA operations to continue to update the media on the incident. With the constant flow of information, PA operations can accomplish two objectives. By keeping the media informed with the most current data, it prevents the media from presenting only one side of the issue. The second objective that can be accomplished is it will avoid the perception that a "cover-up" is underway to protect its own interests or personnel. PA operations not only distribute truthful information, it may also be used to counterpropaganda information from the adversary. 
PROPAGANDA
Air Force doctrine defines counterpropaganda operations as "activities to identify and counter adversary propaganda and expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces situational understanding." 31 As stated earlier, an important characteristic of PA operations is the timely dissemination of information. This is critical in counterpropaganda.
A key tactic in defeating adversary propaganda is to get the information out first. Because it is more time consuming for a PA staff to counter an adversary's false statement, it is important for PA operations to beat the "enemy to the punch". By distributing the most current information before the adversary, PA operations can shape the context of public opinion and negate the impact of adversary propaganda.
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Cable News Network reporter Peter Arnett's reports from Baghdad in Operation Desert
Storm can be example of the effect of distributing information first and the affect it has on public opinion. In this situation, Peter Arnett reported that an attack by coalition forces injured and killed a large portion of civilians. Peter Arnett was not able to substantiate the claims by Iraqi officials; yet he reported the story. Based on this story the world began to become skeptic of the United States claim to avoid civilian casualties. After this story was reported, an increase in anticoalition opinion was noted in the Arab world. 33 In Operation Desert Storm, the US and coalition forces fought a kinetic war against a conventional forces.
Past adversaries of the United States have used propaganda to discredit the United States.
Today's enemies are no different. However because of technological advances of today's global environment, the speed at which they spread their propaganda has drastically increased. Today's Global War on Terror (GWOT) is a different type of war. It is a war not fought between conventional armies; rather it is war of ideas. Technology allows ideas and information to travel all over the world faster than it takes to move armies across the world. There have been several studies regarding how the terrorist organizations use technology to communicate their message.
TERRORIST COMMUNICATION METHODS
One such study was conducted by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in 2007.
The report, entitled Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas, studied how Sunni terrorist groups were using the advances in communication technology to hinder US operations and recruit future terrorists. The report studied products, the producers and the way the terrorist deliver their messages. The study had several key findings.
In studying the products terrorists use to communicate their message, the report categorized the products into two categories: text and audiovisual materials. The report found that text products were the preferred method for the terrorist organizations to use. One type of text product used by terrorists was operational statements. These statements normally communicated the outcome of attacks on coalition forces. Other types of statements were operational press releases. These press releases attempt to communicate the reason and results of attacks. According to the report, the press releases attempt to portray how the Sunni movement views itself and may not accurately reflect a realistic picture. In March 2007, approximately 966 statements were made by 11 different terrorist organizations in Iraq. 34 These statements used various terms such as "crusaders" and "worshippers of the cross" to describe coalition forces. These statements can be classified as propaganda statements. In addition, these terms seek to reinforce the terrorist's idea that the coalition forces are fighting a religious war. Because there are foreign terrorists fighting in Iraq, these statements of a religious war only seek to legitimize the global jihadist movement. 35 The report also noted other types of statements were issued by terrorist organizations.
The other types of statements can be categorized as topical statements. According to the report, these statements differ from operational statements in that the topical statements address issues broader than simply military operations. The topical statements were normally longer than operational statements and covered political issues. The report reviewed several statements from various terrorist organizations. The report noted that differences in statements provided some evidence of possible divisions in terrorist organizations.
Another type of text products terrorists are producing was categorized as inspirational text. The RFE/RL report found terrorists were using martyr biographies and poetry to inspire their members. Martyr biographies were detailed accounts of the lives of terrorists who have died in the GWOT. These biographies seek to make the terrorists seen as heroes to their cause.
The report noted the creation of martyr biographies demonstrated the increased professionalism of terrorist organizations and their desire to communicate their message. Besides the martyr biographies, the report also found that poems were posted on internet websites. Some of these poems would be used in songs to inspire their members. The report also found terrorist organizations were using periodicals and books to distribute information.
Another type of product the terrorists were using was audiovisual products. The report found products varied from recordings of attacks on coalition forces to speeches made by insurgent leaders. These recordings were posted on several websites. Most of the recorded attacks were short in duration. The readings also had commentary with a religious undertone;
again reinforcing the claim that the GWOT is a war of ideas.
Besides the short video recordings, the report discovered terrorists were producing and releasing films on websites. The report found the topics of these films varied. The report found that films were compilations of attack videos, biographies of martyrs, overviews of campaigns, and motivational films. Although the topic of the films differed, the theme of a religious war was evident in the films.
In addition to films, the RFE/RL report discovered recorded audio statements and songs were posted on various websites. Topics for the audio statements included addresses by terrorist leaders, newscasts of attacks and operations conducted against coalition forces. Songs posted on websites were heavily nationalistic in nature. These songs would be used in conjunction with films and other videos in an attempt to inspire its members.
The RFE/RL report discovered several findings. First, terrorist in Iraq are using the internet to communicate its message in a world-wide media campaign. The second finding was that Iraqi terrorist media network is full of global jihadist messages. A third finding was the amount of information on the terrorist websites signifies the demand for this information in the Arab regions. A fourth finding is the mainstream Arab media outlets, knowingly or unknowingly, increase the effectiveness of the terrorist messages by transmitting their messages.
A fifth finding was that terrorist propaganda network is decentralized and does not have an infrastructure. The lack of centralization makes it difficult for coalition forces to kinetically target the media network.
The RFE/RL report is significant besides the findings stated above. The report is important because it also demonstrates the terrorists understanding of how important information is in a war of ideas. In addition, the fact that the terrorist media network is decentralized and does not have a bureaucratic structure for accountability purposes, they are not concerned with the truthfulness of their message. This gives them an advantage over US PA operations which must be concerned with the truth of their information. Commanders at all levels of warfare have a role in neutralizing this advantage.
THE COMMANDER'S ROLE
Commanders in today's military environment must realize that with the advances in modern media technology, information can travel across the world at the speed of light.
Commanders must also recognize their actions and the actions of those they command can be disseminated in an instant. These actions will be viewed differently depending on the audience's culture. There have been writings regarding the role the commanders play in media relations.
One such writing is a US Naval War College paper.
In tool a commander can use to foster their military-media relationship is their PA Office. 37 The PA office has equipment and personnel trained to handle situations that will affect operations and public opinion.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAINING IN THE USAF
The organization tasked with training PA officials for the DoD is the Defense Information School (DINFOS) at Fort Meade, Maryland. DINFOS conducts the Public Affairs Qualification Course (PAQC). The purpose of the PAQC is, "to provide entry-level public affairs training for mid-to-senior level non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers from all US military services, selected foreign nations and US government agency civilians selected for PA assignments at all levels of command." 38 The PAQC is offered in two formats. The first type of format is a residence course which is forty-three training days in length. The resident course is offered five times a year. The residence PAQC has an annual class limit of 300 individuals.
The other type of format is an advanced distributed learning (ADL) program. The ADL program is offered twice a year. It is a six month program that uses an interactive training program which is led by a instructor at PAQC. Unlike other ADL or "correspondence" courses where the student can complete the course at their own pace, the PAQC ADL course has several suspenses that students are required to meet throughout the course. The annual class limit for the ADL program is 96 individuals.
The residence program is structured into eight different functional areas which constitutes 399 hours. The main teaching methodology is lecture. The PAQC covers a variety of topics ranging from PA philosophy to the growth of technology to reporting to interviewing and media relations. Both courses culminate with a three day field training exercise (FTX). The purpose of the FTX is to allow students the opportunity to demonstrate various learned PA techniques in an operational scenario. The PAQCs are primarily available for those DoD members who are assigned to perform PA functions.
In addition to the PAQC, DINFOS offers the Coast Guard Public Affairs Course. This a one week collateral PA duty course designed for US Coast Guard (USCG) members who do not have the manpower for PA specialists. Although this course is designed for the USCG, representatives at DINFOS have expressed interest in expanding the one week course to include other services and military specialties. 39 The applicability of this course will be discussed later. instruction on how to tell that story using external sources and community relations. ACC PA also recognizes the importance of BLOGS and is developing a plan to increase the course attention to BLOGS. 42 The training squadron commanders receive is helpful but it is very limited in time and depth. In both PACAF and ACC the training lessons are limited to one hour sessions. There are other options for squadron commanders to use to help communicate the US message.
TECHNIQUES FOR A SQUADRON COMMANDER
Many individuals acknowledge the importance of controlling information in the GWOT. Airmen to use these interactive sites. The training should be on the technical aspects of using these sites. In addition PA representatives should provide instruction on maintaining good OPSEC when using these sites. A delicate balance needs to be maintained in communicating the strategic message and maintaining good OPSEC.
In today's environment, information is critical to mission success at all levels of warfare.
When a squadron commander encourages their Airmen using BLOGs, they must also remind them to safeguard information that can affect mission accomplishment. In order to ensure good OPSEC, the squadron commander and PA representatives should monitor BLOGs to ensure Airmen are practicing good OPSEC. In addition, PA representatives should brief proper OPSEC techniques when given the opportunity at unit training day. The key element in implementing these opportunities is the squadron commander.
Different squadrons have different personnel and different mission. It is up to the squadron commander to decide how much emphasis they want to place on IO. Some commanders may see the value while others may not have the man power to emphasize IO. It is the responsibility of all Airmen and commanders to understand the actions that they take can and will have an impact on the political, operational and tactical levels of war.
CONCLUSION
Immediately after the attacks on the United States by terrorist on 11 September 2001, there was an immediate out cry for action to be taken against those who committed the acts.
When the military answered the call, public support for the armed forces was extremely high.
Almost nine years later, US forces have defeated armies in Afghanistan and Iraq; however they have lost public support. In today's fast paced information environment, US and world public opinion are critical for the US to accomplish its strategic objectives.
Recent DoD and military leaders have realized the importance of information in the GWOT and have changed doctrine to reflect this importance. Joint and service doctrines have been updated to include strategic communications, information operations and public affairs. It is important for commanders to understand that the GWOT is a war of ideas not of armies. In addition, commanders and leaders must convey the stable and creditable message when employing the instruments of power. If they do not, then the GWOT will drag out and the creditability of the US forces will be diminished. An option that military leaders can to accomplish is to communicate and train their individuals on the importance of IO.
The technological advances in communication media have helped the adversaries of the United States to spread their message. Terrorist organizations use with great success the internet and other audiovisual techniques to communicate and recruit future terrorists. Once a story is out to the public it becomes more difficult to change the public's opinion about the truth of the story.
Currently terrorists have an advantage in the speed at which they disseminate information. Their organizations are not structured to support accountability for truthful information. The DoD's information is required to be truthful and timely.
PA individuals are trained to deliver truthful information in a timely manner. There are other training opportunities for services to take advantage of in order to help win public opinion.
Squadron commanders can have PA representatives in their squadron to increase their access to PA operations. Another technique a squadron commander can use to communicate the strategic message is to train and encourage their Airman to use BLOGs to spread the positive stories of the USAF.
The US DoD has recognized the importance of information in operations. It has adjusted at a relatively slow pace. If the US DoD does not continue and increase the rate at which it adjusts to IO, the United States stature in the world will be weakened. Every person in the DoD has a responsibility and the opportunity to communicate this message. Now is the time for all DoD individuals to step up and take action to help win the war on ideas and public opinion. 
